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COMMENTS
DUPLICATIVE STATUTES, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION, AND THE
ILLINOIS ARMED VIOLENCE STATUTE
Prosecutorial discretion has achieved over-
whelming acceptance in the American criminal
justice system.t Whether it exists because of the
need for individualized treatment of defendants,2
the limits in lawmakers' abilities to predict all the
conduct they wish to prohibit,3 the inherent limits
of statutory language and definition,4 or the im-
possibility of reviewing all the decisions of every
prosecutor in the United States, the presence of
prosecutorial discretion is no longer an issue. Nev-
ertheless, the question of just how much prosecu-
torial discretion is needed continues to fuel debate
among the commentators.
Supporters of broad prosecutorial discretion ar-
gue that the only alternatives to it are never-ending
review of decisions,5 overly rigid treatment of de-
fendants,0 and inability to put limited funds to the
best possible use.7 In sum, they claim the American
system would collapse without vast amounts of
prosecutorial discretion. However, those opposing
broad grants of prosecutorial discretion fear the
dangers of selective enforcement by an unchecked
prosecutor.8 They refute the claim that prosecuto-
rial discretion is inevitable by pointing to Ger-
'See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTicE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY (1969); B. GROSSMAN, THE PROSECtOroR: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (1969); Buba-
ney, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecu-
torial Discretion, 13 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 473 (1976); Cole,
The Decision to Prosecute, 4 L. & Soc'Y REV. 331 (1970);
Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. GRIM. L.
REV. 383 (1976); Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in
Criminal Justice, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 12 (1972); Thomas,
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507
(1976). See, e.g., Lagoy, An Empirical Study on Information
Usage for Prosecutorial Decision Making in Plea Investigations,
13 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 435 (1976).
2See Bubaney, supra note 1, at 492; Rosett, supra note
1, at 17.
3 See Cox, supra note 1, at 386.
4 See Rosett, supra note 1, at 20.
5 Cox, supra note 1, at 389.6 Id. at 390; K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 17, 52.
7 Bubaney, supra note 1, at 492.
8 See K. DAVIs, supra note 1, at 224; Breitel, Controls in
Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 429
(1960); Cox, supra note 1, at 391; LaFave, The Prosecutor's
Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 532, 537
(1970); Rosett, supra note 1, at 12, 20.
many, where prosecutorial discretion is practically
nonexistent.9 According to this group, prosecutorial
discretion makes easy the arbitrary, the discrimi-
natory, and the oppressive.0
These arguments, both pro and con, apply in
full force in the duplicative statute setting. Statutes
are duplicative when the same conduct can be
prosecuted under more than one statute. If the
penalties required by the duplicative statutes differ,
the danger is that different people who are equally
situated can receive different punishments. While
courts have allowed this result to follow from the
prosecutor's decision whether to charge," it is ques-
tionable to allow discretion in the duplicative stat-
ute setting: the prosecutor has already made the
decision to charge, the prosecutor and police have
already allocated their limited funds;12 in short, a
great deal of discretion has already been exercised.
Professor Davis states, "Let us not oppose discre-
tionary power, let us oppose unnecessary discre-
tionary power,"' 3 and in the duplicative statute
setting, it becomes more probable that the discre-
tion is unnecessary. The prosecutor is given an
extra tool which he might use as a lever for plea
bargaining14 or as a means for retaliating against
somebody he dislikes. These dangers of unfairness
must be balanced against the alleged benefit of the
discretionary power: that the prosecutor can tailor
Justice Jackson emphasized the prosecutor's ability to
do both good and evil:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty
and reputation than any other person in
America.... While the prosecutor at his best is one
of the most beneficent forces in our society, when
he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one
of the worst. The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & C. 3 (1940).
9 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 194; see also Langbein,
Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439 (1974).
10 Breitel, supra note 8, at 429 (1960).
" See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
12 The fact that no prosecutor has enough funds to
prosecute all offenders has been used to defend the pros-
ecutor's decision not to prosecute. LaFave, supra note 8,
at 533.
13 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 25.
14 LaFave, supra note 8, at 541.
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the punishment to the crime and the defendant's
individual circumstances.
I. THE BATCHELDER DECISION
In United States v. Batchelder i s the United States
Supreme Court attempted to address the problem
of prosecutorial discretion in the duplicative statute
context. Yet it failed-to respond adequately to the
arguments against that discretion, and did not
make it clear that there is more than one type of
duplicative statue. This comment will analyze
Batchelder, set out a three-part scheme classifying
duplicative statute situations, and discuss the Illi-
nois Armed Violence Statute,' 6 which provides a
clear example of the dangers inherent in duplica-
tive statutes which are charged simultaneously.
A. BACKGROUND
United States v. Batchelder17 involved two statutes,
each of which prohibited conduct the other did
not, but which overlapped to the extent that they
prohibited some of the same conduct. Batchelder
had been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922,18 part
of which makes receipt by a felon of a firearm
which previously has been transported by interstate
commerce punishable 19 by no more than five years
in prison or a $5,000 fine, or both. However, part
of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) 20 which describes
is 442 U.S. 114.
16 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 33A-2 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
17 442 U.S. 114.
18 In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1968) pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to
marihuana or any depressant stimulant drug... or
narcotic drug... or
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defec-
tive or who has been committed to any mental
institution; to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce.
'9 The applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (1968),
provides in relevant part: "Whoever violates any provi-
sion of this chapter... shall be fined not more than
$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both...."
20 Section 1202(a) states:
Any person who-
(1) has been convicted by a court of the United
States or of a State or any political subdivision
thereof of a felony, or
(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces
under dishonorable conditions, or
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United
exactly the same offense, sets a maximum of only
two years in prison, or a $10,000 fine, or both.
21
The defendant received five years under § 922(h),
and challenged the use of the harsher statute as a
violation of his right to equal protection under the
law.s
The Seventh Circuit upheld the defendant's
claim two-to-one23 Finding the legislative history
inconclusive and the two statutory provisions in-
consistent, the court used general principles of
statutory construction in reaching its decision.
24
The court relied on the principles that criminal
legislation should be applied in favor of lenity, that
later enacted statutes may impliedly repeal earlier
ones, and that when a serious doubt of constitu-
tionality arises, the statute, if possible, will be
construed so as to avoid the constitutional ques-
tion.25 Since the court found constitutional prob-
lems with inconsistent penalties, it construed the
statutes together as limiting imprisonment to two
years for receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon.26
The Seventh Circuit emphasized Justice Black's
dissenting opinion in Berra v. United States.27 Berra
had been charged with tax fraud, punishable by a
fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment of
not more than five years, or both.'s He sought to
instruct the jury that it could choose to convict
under a different statute which covered the same
conduct:2 but which provided for a lesser penalty.30
The majority opinion, assuming arguendo that both
States or any political subdivision thereof being
mentally incompetent, or
(4) having been a citizen of the United States
has renounced his citizenship, or
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the
United States, and who receives, possesses, trans-
ports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the
date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than two years or both.
21 id.
22 Id. at 630.
23 Id. Circuit Judges Cummings and Bauer formed the
majority; Judge McMillan from the Northern District of
Illinois, sitting by designation, dissented.




6 Id. at 631.
27351 U.S.131, 137 (1956) (Black, J.,joined by Doug-
las.J., dissenting).
26 U.S.C. § 145(b) (1939) prohibited the filing of
any"false or fraudulent" return.
26 U.S.C. § 3616(a) (1939) forbade delivery of any
"false or fraudulent list, return, account, or statement
with intent to defeat or evade the valuation .... It set





statutes were applicable to tax returns,3 ' disposed
of the case by holding only that the jury's role was
limited to deciding issues of fact and did not
include making findings of law in choosing under
which statute to convict.3 2 This was specifically
said to be the only question before the Court,' so
the majority failed to reach the duplicative statute
question.
Justice Black, in dissent, would have reached the
question of the constitutionality of the sentence in
light of the overlapping statutes.3 4 He utterly re-
jected the concept that the power to punish iden-
tical conduct as a felony or a misdemeanor could
be left to the prosecutor.35 Justice Black cited United
States v. Beacon Brass Co.,36 in which the Court had
said:
We have before us two statutes, each of which
proscribes conduct not covered by the other, but
which overlap in a narrow area illustrated by the
instant case. At least where different proof is required for
each offense, a single act or transaction may violate
more than one criminal statute ...... (emphasis sup-
plied).
Justice Black explained that in Berra, unlike
Beacon Brass, identical rather than differing proof
was required for each offense, causing three consti-
tutional flaws. First, under due process, statutes
must fairly and clearly define the conduct to be
made criminal and the possible punishment. This
is not done where "either of these statutes can be
selected as the controlling law at the whim of the
prosecuting attorney."3 8 Second, the delegation of
such vast power to the prosecutor violates the
doctrine of separation of powers, because it substi-
tutes "the prosecutor's caprice for the adjudicatory
process." 39 Third, under the equal protection
clause, "no different or higher punishment should
be imposed upon one than upon another if the
offense and the circumstances are the same.
'4
0
Justice Black would have reversed or, at least,
31 The Court later held that there was indeed a differ-
ence in the amount of proof required under the two
statutes. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
- 351 U.S. at 134-35.33 id.
' Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. at 137 (Black, J.,
joined by Douglas, J., dissenting).3
'Id. at 139.
36 344 U.S. 43, 45 (1952).
37 Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. at 139 (quoting
United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. at 45).
38 351 U.S. at 139.
9Id. at 140.
40Id.
remanded for sentencing under the morq lenient
statute. 1
The Seventh Circuit adopted these arguments in
Batchelder. First, the court found that the two over-
lapping provisions of the Crime Control Act vio-
lated the due process clause because they too va-
guely defined the punishment that could be ad-
ministered.4 2 Second, the broad delegation to the
prosecutor violated the separation of powers doc-
trine.4 3 Third, the likelihood of different treatment
of similarly situated people violated the equal pro-
tection clause. 4 In rejecting the well settled rule
that the prosecutor can choose which of two over-
lapping statutes can be applied to a particular
defendant, 45 the court emphasized that the cases
cited for this proposition involved statutes which
did not have the same elements of proof.4 6 The
case was remanded for sentencing under the more
lenient statute.4 7
The dissent disagreed, finding support in the line
of cases that the majority distinguished. 8 Even
though in those cases the elements of proof tended
to be different rather than identical, as in Batchelder,
the dissent found them applicable because of the
general theories of prosecutorial discretion which
those cases endorsed. 49 The dissent added that "a
dissenting opinion, [in Berra], even by a respected
constitutional scholar such as the late Justice Black,
is weak authority...."50
The importance of the Seventh Circuit Batchelder
opinion is that it directly compares the two contra-
dictory lines of cases dealing with duplicative stat-
utes. One line originated in the Berra dissent and is
followed in several federal51 and state52 courts. It
holds that where statutes overlap so that the pros-
ecutor can select the statute offering a harsher or
milder penalty for exactly the same conduct, with-
out any other guidelines, the equal protection
clause is violated. The second and more recent line
of cases holds that a prosecutor's ability to choose
4i Id. The more lenient statute was 26 U.S.C. § 3616(a)
(1939).
42581 F.2d at 631.43 
id.
44Id.
45 Id. at 632.
46Id. at 633.
47 Id. at 636.
48 581 F.2d at 637 (dissenting opinion).
49 id.
50 Id. at 639.
51 United States v. Coppola, 425 F.2d 660 (2d Cir.
1969); United States v. Hairston, 437 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.
Ill. 1977).
' See cases cited in note 136 infra.
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one statute over another in the overlapping situa-
tion is no different from his ability to choose
whether to prosecute or what charge to bring.
53
This line of cases finds no violation of the equal
protection clause. The Seventh Circuit endorsed
the Berra dissent and its progeny after directly
comparing them with the other authorities. How-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed without address-
ing the comparison in as much detail.54
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Marshall
found that the legislative history quite conclusively
established Congressional intent to enact two in-
dependent gun control statutes, "each enforceable
on its own terms.' 's Therefore, the court of appeals
erred in its application of general principles of
statutory construction because there was no ambi-
guity to interpret in favor of lenity, and no repeal
was intended5 6 As for the principle that courts
construe statutes to avoid constitutional questions,
the Court found no constitutional infirmities.
57
The Court recognized "the fundamental tenet
that '[n]o one may be required at peril of life,
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning
of penal statutes' "5 and that the sentencing pro-
visions must clearly state the consequences of vio-
lating a criminal statute. Nevertheless, the Court
found that the statutes gave adequate notice.59
Even though two different penalties were possible,
a defendant could know the range of punishment
to which he might be subjected, just as he would
in the typical statute providing for alternative pun-
ishment.60 Moreover, the Court rested its judgment
on the settled rule that "when an act violates more
than one criminal statute, the Government may
prosecute under either so long as it does not dis-
criminate against any one class of defendants."
61
With respect to that series of cases indicating
that overlapping statutes with identical elements
63 See cases cited in note 131 infra. See also United States
v. Fournier, 483 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Chakmakis, 449 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1971); Hopkins v.
United States, 414 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 935 (1965); Ehrlich v. United States, 238 F.2d 481
(5th Cir. 1956); Bartlett v. United States, 166 F.2d 920
(10th Cir. 1948); Clemons v. United States, 137 F.2d 302
(4th Cir. 1943).
54 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114.
55 Id. at 119.
m Id. at 121.
• 57 Id. at 123.
58 Id. (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939)).
59 Id. at 123.
60 d.61 Id. at 123-24.
of proof give the prosecutor unfettered discretion,
the Court held this analysis "factually and legally
unsound. ' ' 62 Discretion is limited rather than un-
fettered in such cases because race, religion, and
other suspect differences are constitutionally im-
permissible reasons for choosing one statute over
another, thus placing real limits on the prosecu-
tor.63 Furthermore, these same controls apply when
the prosecutor determines he has enough proof to
convict under either of two statutes which have
different elements of proof.6' The prosecutor in this
situation may be influenced by the penalties avail-
able upon conviction without violating the due
process or equal protection clauses. Finally, there
is no improper delegation violating the separation
of powers doctrine because Congress had expressly
set forth the range of penalties available.s
B. THE FLAWS OF BATCHELDER
The Court in Batchelder makes a clear choice
between the two prevailing views regarding over-
lapping statutes with varying penalties by holding
such statutes to be constitutional, at least where
each statute covers conduct the other does not.66
Yet, the decision fails to answer fully the problems
raised in the Berra dissent and cases like it, and is
therefore subject to criticism.67 It glosses over del-






66Justice Marshall stresses, both in the text and foot-
note, that the statutes are not identical because each
contains a type of person or conduct within its prohibition
which the other does not. United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. at 119 n.5.
67 The case completely mirrors the government brief,
even to the point of dividing up topics with the same type
of headings and organization. Thus, it is not surprising
that it fails to raise many issues beneficial to the defend-
ant. See Brief for Respondent passim, United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
68 The Court does make several findings that are un-
impeachable. The Court adequately treats the Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, issue of required notice in
criminal statutes of what is prohibited and what penalties
are possible. Lanzetta explains that statutes give adequate
notice of the conduct prohibited and its ensuing penalty
if any "person of ordinary intelligence" can understand
the statute. Id. at 453. Under such circumstances, there
is no deprivation of due process. Id. Batchelder held that
the two overlapping statutes were clearly written. Each
specifically applied to a felon who receives a gun that
has passed through interstate commerce. 442 U.S. at 118.
Therefore, a "person of ordinary intelligence" could prob-
ably understand that the minimum penalty for being a
COMMENTS
The reason for the Supreme Court's failure to
answer the problems raised is that it treats Black's
opinion as an enigma. The Court uses a long list of
cases to reject the Berra dissent69 but neglects to cite
the many cases that use Black's rationale. Neither
Batchelder's nor the government's brief contained
a citation to state cases; 70 this perhaps excuses the
Supreme Court's oversight. However, at least five
state supreme courts align themselves with the
reasoning found in the Berra dissent and indirectly
have decided against the Batchelder holding.
7 1
Moreover, several of the cases used to bolster
support against the Berra dissent are themselves
highly questionable. For example, the Court cites
United States v. Beacon Brass72 as authority for the
proposition that the prosecutor may choose from
statutes requiring the same elements of proof but
having differing penalties.73 As the Berra dissent
pointed out, Beacon Brass involved different elements
of proof,74 and therefore is inapplicable. The Su-
preme Court also points to SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 7 in which the Court had said "[t]he fact that
there may be some overlap [between the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934] is neither unusual nor unfortunate., 76 Yet in
National Securities there was no allegation that the
felon in possession of a gun which has passed through
interstate commerce would be the lesser of the two mini-
mums provided by the overlapping statutes, while the
maximum is the greater of the two penalties set out in
each of the statutes.
The Supreme Court also read the legislative history
better than the Seventh Circuit. Statements from Senate
and House debate indicate a clear intention to have both
statutes coexist; the later was not meant to preempt the
earlier one.
Senator Long, the sponsor of § 1202, explained during
floor debate that § 1202 would "take nothing" from, but
merely "add to" Title IV. 114 CONG. REc. 14774 (1968).
Representative Machen on the House floor stated that §
1202 would complement Title IV. 114 CONG. REc. 16286
(1968). Both statements were cited by the Court. United
States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 119-21.
0 442 U.S. at 124.
70 Brief for Respondent passim, United States v. Batch-
elder, 442 U.S. 114.
71 See cases cited in note 137 infra. Nevada, New Mex-
ico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington all reject Batchelder.
The same is probably true of California, Kansas, and
Texas. See note 134 infra; 344 U.S. 43 (1962).
72 See text accompanying note 37 supra. Marshall makes
the same mistake by citing Rosenberg v. United States,
346 U.S. 273 (1953), which rests on the same language.
"At least where different proof is required for each of-
fense...." Id. at 294.
73 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124.
74 344 U.S. 43. See text accompanying notes 36-38
supra.
s 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
76 Id. at 468.
penalties under the two acts would have been
substantially different, distinguishing the case from
Batchelder, where the penalties were indeed differ-
ent. To cite Beacon Brass and National Securities for
the proposition that overlapping statutes which
require different elements of proof and carry dif-
ferent penalties are constitutional is to rewrite them
into something they are not.
The crux of the Court's reasoning is that the
overlapping statute situation in Batchelder resembles
other situations in which the prosecutor has broad
discretion, and that therefore broad discretion ex-
ists in the overlapping statute situation as well.
This is a conceptual error, because often the situ-
ations are not comparable. An example of a situa-
tion frequently compared to duplicative statutes is
where two statutes exist with differing evidentiary
requirements, and the prosecutor has enough evi-
dence to proceed under either.7 7 In such a case, the
prosecutor may choose between the two, and even
be influenced by the differences in penalties pro-
vided.78 This situation however, is fundamentally
different from Batchelder because the state, by mak-
ing different evidentiary requirements and differ-
ent penalties, has made a judgment on which
conduct is worse. Where the ensuing penalty is
greater for one type of conduct than for another,
the state specifically has decided that the conduct
penalized more heavily poses the greater danger to
society. A battery, or willful and unlawful use of
force upon another, 79 is conduct having different
proof requirements from an assault, or putting
another in fear of receiving a battery;8° typically
the penalty is greater for battery.81 A prosecutor
might be able to prove either, but would choose
battery because the legislature has in effect deemed
it a greater danger to society by placing a higher
penalty on it. This is not true with overlapping
statutes such as those in Batchelder because although
the penalties are different, the conduct can be the
same. Neither statute defines a greater danger to
society where the conduct prohibited is identical.
Thus the prosecutor in Batchelder lacks the guidance
77 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 117.
7
8 Id. at 118.79 This is one typical definition. See BLACK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 193 (4th ed. 1968). A standard statutory treat-
ment can be found in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-3 (1962
& Supp. 1979).
s3 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-1 (1962 & Supp. 1979);
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 147 (4th ed. 1968).
" For example, in Illinois both crimes are misdemean-
ors, but the penalty for battery is Class A, more severe




he had where the statutes prohibited different con-
duct.
The Supreme Court similarly errs in comparing
discretion in the overlapping statute situation to
the prosecutor's decision whether to press charges
at all.8 2 The prosecutor has very broad discretion
in deciding whether to prosecute, but he is guided
in his exercise of discretion by the amount of
evidence he can muster. This guidance is wholly
lacking in a case like Batchelder because the evidence
required under either statute is the same.
The Batchelder Court addressed the equal protec-
tion question by explaining that Oyler v. Boless3 and
Yick Wo v. Hopkins84 show the limit the equal pro-
tection clause places on prosecutorial discretion.
Unlike the Berra dissent, the Batchelder court found
that this limit was not exceeded. To understand
the issue, however, it is first necessary to look at
the equal protection clause itself.s5
Briefly, the equal protection clause allows the
government to make classifications in the creation
and application of laws, but the classification can-
not be based on an impermissible standard or be
used arbitrarilys 6 Usually the classification is eval-
uated under the "rational relation" test: if the
classification bears any rational relationship to the
governmental purpose for enacting that classifica-
tion, it will be upheld. 7 However, if a fundamental
right is involved, such as first amendment rights,
travel, voting or privacy,s8 or if a "suspect" classi-
fication such as race, national origin, or alienage is
used,89 the "strict scrutiny" test applies. Under this
more exacting test, the government must show a
''compelling" interest in the classification which is
so important that it warrants overriding funda-
mental constitutional rights.90 In addition, there
must be no less drastic alternatives for reaching the
governmental objective.
9 1
Strict scrutiny is not applicable to Batchelder
because no suspect classification or fundamental
82442 U.S. at 117.
83 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
84 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
"" U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1, states in pertinent
part "No State shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
86 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 519 (1977).8 7 Id. at 524. See F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412 (1920).
sJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 86,
at 382 n.3.
' See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
9J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 86,
at 524.
9 1
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1001-02
(1978).
right is involved. The statutes challenged in Batch-
elder made no classifications on their face.92 Rather,
the danger is that they are arbitrary or capricious
as applied. The equal protection clause covers ap-
plication of statutes by government officials,93 mak-
ing the rational relation test appropriate.
The equal protection clause involves groups; it
focuses on an individual who is treated differently
because of the group to which he belongs. The
Batchelder opinion and the Berra dissent each discuss
equal protection, but in different ways. The Berra
dissent assumes equal protection applies, but Batch-
elder discusses equal protection only as it relates to
the defense of discriminatory prosecution. Since
that defense involves being a member of a group
discriminated against, at least some question arises
as to whether it applies to Milton Batchelder, the
defendant who never made that claim.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins94 was the first case involving
a successful defense of discriminatory prosecution,
and the Batchelder Court, by invoking Oyler v.
Boles,95 aligns itself with the Yick Wo discussion of
discriminatory prosecution. In Yick Wo, an ordi-
nance concerning private laundries was found to
violate the equal protection clause when it was
enforced only against Chinese,' but it took Oyler v.
Boles97 to make explicit the two elements of proof
necessary in a Yick Wo-type case. To show dis-
criminatory prosecution, the defendant must prove
that the prosecutor failed to proceed against others
whom he knew to be in the same position as the
defendant, and that the knowing discrimination
was based on an unjustifiable standard. 9s Cases
'2 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448; Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356.
9 The statutes are set out in notes 18 and 20 supra.
94 118 U.S. 356. See note 96 infra.
95 368 U.S. 448. Oyler had been convicted under West
Virginia's habitual criminal statute, which provided for
a mandatory life sentence after three previous convictions
of crimes punishable by imprisonment. Id at 449. Oyler
charged the prosecutor with discriminatory prosecution,
and presented evidence that the mandatory life sentence
had been invoked in only a minority of cases where it
had been applicable. Id at 455. This defense failed
because there was no showing that the prosecutor knew
he could have proceeded against the others, or that he
was using an unjustifiable standard. Id. at 456.
9 Id. at 373-74. The municipal ordinance made it
unlawful to operate a private laundry without first ob-
taining the consent of a board of supervisors. Proof was
presented which clearly showed that the ordinance was
enforced only against Chinese. The Court found that the
statute violated the equal protection clause because, even
though it was neutral on its face, it was administered
unequally and unfairly. Id.
97 368 U.S. 448.
98 Id. at 456.
1980]
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have illustrated that it is very difficult to prove an
unjustifiable or impermissible standard; those
which have been held impermissible have been
based on race,9 exercise of first amendment
rights, 1°° political activities, l0 ' and type of business
organization.'
°z
In limiting the application of the equal protec-
tion clause to the reasoning in Yick Wo and Oyler,
the Supreme Court places a very tenuous check on
prosecutorial discretion and sets a standard a de-
fendant would find very difficult to meet. Only
this very limited set of discriminatory practices has
ever been successfully attacked. The fear of arbi-
trariness, caprice, or whim that was so prevalent in
Justice Black's Berra'0 3 dissent suggests a sort of
random discrimination which does not fit into any
of these enumerated types. It is hard to tailor a
claim of impermissible standard around anything
as nebulous as people whom the prosecutor dislikes,
or who antagonize him during plea bargaining. If
such a claim were made, however, the equal pro-
tection clause would have to be applied even under
Batchelder. The proof problems in showing that the
prosecutor acted in this way would, of course, be
tremendous. Nonetheless, if the prosecutor pursued
the more harsh penalty against those people he did
not like, the action would be arbitrary and capri-




It might not even be necessary to define a group
for equal protection purposes, since at least one
circuit court case dispenses with that requirement.
United States v. Falk s05 involved a defendant who
9 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356.
loo United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973)
(antiwar activities); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d
1074 (4th Cir. 1972) (leafletting against the draft); Dixon
v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(claiming unfair police practices).
10 United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.
1974) (union organizing).
'02 People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 A.D.2d 12, 225
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962) (discrimination against discount
stores).
i03 Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. at 139 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
104 16A AM. Jtn. 2D Constitutional Law § 753 (1979).
106 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973). Even though it was a
circuit court case, Falk is the "leading case" on discrimi-
natory prosecution. Amsterdam, The One-Sided Sword: Se-
lective Prosecution in Federal Courts, 6 Rtrr.-CAM. L.J. 1, 10
(1974). Even opponents of it who argue its application
should be limited concede this point. See Cardinale &
Feldman, The Federal Courts and the Right to Nondiscrimina-
tory Administration of the Criminal Law: A Critical View, 29
SYRACUSE L. REv. 659 (1978).
The cases citing Falk are far too numerous to mention.
The most recent affirmation of Falk occurred in United
States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 941 (1979), where the court held that "relief
was an active draft resister charged with violating
a law requiring all people in his age group to carry
a draft card.1'6 A defense of discriminatory prose-
cution was successful (the first amendment right to
freedom of speech was implicated as well as the
equal protection clause). Falk could show that
many people without draft cards were not prose-
cuted, but there was no allegation that other sim-
ilarly situated resisters were prosecuted. Falk did
not show he was a member of a group being
discriminated against, but he still won. From this,
it is possible that Batchelder could charge unfair
treatment by pointing to others prosecuted under
the milder gun control statute, but would not have
to show similarly situated persons were in the same
group and prosecuted under the same harsh stat-
ute. It is not enough for the Supreme Court simply
to point to Yick Wo and Oyler when questions like
this are left unanswered.
The conclusion that the Yick Wo standard, as
applied by the Court, does not adequately protect
the defendant in an overlapping statute setting
gains even more force in light of Butz v. Economou.1
0 7
There, the Court approved, by way of dicta, the
proposition that because of the prosecutor's posi-
tion in the judicial process, he must be given
absolute immunity from tort liability to perform
his function properly.
1 °8
The Butz Court explained that the danger of
retaliatory suits by angry defendants and the pos-
sibility that the prosecutor, facing such suits, would
not initiate actions, or be as aggressive in court,
warranted absolute immunity for the prosecutor in
judicial and quasi-judicial spheres of action."° This
would seem to include the selection of charges.
Thus Batchelder and Butz together give the prose-
cutor free rein to be as vindictive and arbitrary as
he pleases (short of discriminating against a suspect
class), secure in the knowledge that he cannot be
sued for damages, and that the defendant will
would be available when intentional or purposeful dis-
crimination was practiced against an individual (even
though the discrimination was not class-based)," and that
the defendant "could raise his claim of selective prose-
cution based on individual discrimination." Id. at 569
n.9.
'06 479 F.2d at 617.
107 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
'08 Id. at 511-12. Though the holding of the Court
involved immunity for officials in the Department of
Agriculture, some of them were given absolute immunity
because their functions were similar to state and federal
prosecutors. Prosecutors have absolute immunity because
their office requires them to make independent decisions
free from outside pressure. Id.
" Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 515 (citing Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)).
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almost certainly be unable to have the charges
overturned by claiming discriminatory prosecu-
tion.
Even assuming that the prosecutor is scrupu-
lously fair,"10 there is still a great danger in the
Batchelder approach because people may believe the
prosecutor is acting unfairly. The canons of legal
ethics recognize the danger of the appearance of
impropriety even where none actually exists."' Our
government may be one of laws rather than of
men, but if people feel the laws are unfairly ad-
ministered, the foundation becomes very shaky. As
Justice Brandeis observed, "In a government of
laws, existence of the government will be imperiled
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example.""112 The Batchelder decision is likely either
to treat similarly situated people differently, and
therefore unfairly, or else raise the fear that people
will be so treated.
An additional reason explaining the Court's ac-
tion appears in the government's brief,'13 the dis-
sent to the Seventh Circuit Batchelder opinion,"
4
several cases cited by the Court,"' and may be
implicit in Justice Marshall's opinion. If the Sev-
enth Circuit opinion had been upheld, numerous
overlapping statutes" 6 would be struck down. This
is basically a floodgates argument. Yet the results
would be salutary rather than destructive.
All that would be necessary is to take statutes
such as the two in Batchelder and make them con-
sistent: punish the same conduct with the same
penalties and thus eliminate the undue discretion.
One method would be to allow sentencing only
under the less harsh of the two overlapping stat-
utes.1' 7 This would be a stopgap measure only,
"o One hopes that most prosecutors exercise due care
and act in as unbiased a way as they can in the perform-
ance of their duties. However, the old political observa-
tion that "[a] 11 power tends to corrupt, and absolute
power corrupts absolutely," see J. BARTLErr, BARTLETr'S
FAMILIAR QUOTAATIONS 335a n.1 (13th ed. 1955) (1887
letter from John Emerich Edward Dalberg, Lord Acton,
to Biship Mandell Creighton), suggests that the mere
presence of the discretion given in overlapping statute
situations could be dangerous.
" ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Canon 9 (1975).
12 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"' Brief for Petitioner at 33, United States v. Batch-
elder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
IN 581 F.2d at 637.
"' See cases cited at 442 U.S. at 121-22.
16 All of the overlapping statutes cited in text accom-
panying notes 153-59 infra might have to be rewritten.
57Some courts have recommended this. Berra v.
because it takes the decision of which penalty to
apply to the proscribed conduct out of the legisla-
ture's hands. The legislature, if unsatisfied with the
results of sentencing under the lesser statute, could
repeal it, leaving the harsher one to be applied to
all defendants. It could also repeal both and set a
new penalty at something in between. Many of the
problems caused by overlapping statutes merely
result from sloppy legislative drafting." 8 Rather
than opening floodgates, a Supreme Court decision
adopting the arguments made in the Berra dissent
would force legislators to be more thorough and
careful in writing and amending criminal statutes.
Such an opportunity should be firmly grasped
rather than ignored out of fear of opening flood-
gates to legislative difficulties.
Though the Supreme Court in Batchelder did not
cover in depth the necessity for prosecutorial dis-
cretion, one can assume that the traditional ration-
ale for discretion is present. The presence of two
statutes arguably gives the prosecutor a chance to
individualize his treatment of defendants, 19 per-
haps using the lesser statute for first offenders, or
people who assist him to catch other law-breakers.
However, those same goals could be achieved with
one statute. The prosecutor would still have the
option not to press charges, and even a single
statute could have some variation in penalties as-
sessed. With only one statute though, the prosecu-
tor could no longer select a single statute by him-
self. The judge and jury would be brought into the
penalty decision, thus shedding light on the entire
process. Openness is recognized as one of the best
ways to harness discretion;"' it could work here to
prevent unfairness.
II. A METHOD OF ANALYSIS FOR DUPLICATIVE
STATUTES
Despite its shortcoming on both legal and policy
grounds, Batchelder is the law. Where statutes forbid
the same conduct, the prosecutor may choose either
United States, 351 U.S. at 140 (Black, J., dissenting);
Batchelder v. United States, 581 F.2d at 636; United
States v. Hairston, 437 F. Supp. at 36; State v. Shondel,
22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146. This technique has the
advantage of leaving at least some penalty on the books
until the legislature can decide which statutory scheme it
prefers.
8 To combat such drafting, courts may use "implied
repeal," the later statute acting as an implied repeal of
the earlier one, or the more specific statute by implication
repealing the less specific one. See Comment, Prosecutorial
Discretion in the Duplicative Statute Setting, 42 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 455, 462-63 (1971).
11 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 17.
20Id. at 111.
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statute, and may even take advantage of a large
variation in penalty provisions. 12 1 Yet, Justice Mar-
shall emphasized that each statute forbade some-
thing the other did not. 122 This means that the
question of constitutionality of statutes that are
completely identical except for differing penalties
has not been reached. Moreover, in Batchelder the
prosecutor used only one of the two statutes avail-
able. Thus the question of whether the prosecutor
could charge under both statutes also remains
open.
These three different variations form a concep-
tual scheme for analyzing duplicative statutes.
Courts faced with duplicative statutes can resolve
them by resorting to canons of statutory construc-
tion' 23 such as preferring the later statute to the
earlier one, 124 or the more specific statute to the less
specific one.' 25 These canons leave the prosecutor
with a single statute, thus effectively limiting dis-
cretion and promoting equal treatment of similarly
situated defendants. These canons, however, are
available only in a small number of duplicative
statute situations, and the former one may no
longer be valid in light of the Supreme Court's
refusal in Batchelder to apply the later enacted
statute so as to repeal the earlier one.
26
The tripartite framework has the advantage of
covering all duplicative statute situations. Mar-
shall's footnote in Batchelder adds at least some
support to such a division. 127 This section will
discuss all three situations.
A. IDENTICAL STATUTES
In diagram 1, the "A" circle represents conduct
that Statute "A" prohibits, while the "B" circle
represents conduct that Statute "B" prohibits. The
duplicative statute problem occurs when conduct
is prohibited by more than one statute. In the
121 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 118.
"2 See note 66 supra.
'23 See State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456
(1966); State v. Blevins, 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 208 (1956);
State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146; State v.
Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075 (1959); State v.
Collins, 55 Wash. 2d 469, 348 P.2d 214 (1960).
'2 See State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456;
State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075; State
v. Collins, 55 Wash. 2d 469, 348 P.2d 214.
125 See State v. Blevins, 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 208.
12" The Court would use implied repeal only if there
were a "positive repugnancy" between the two statutes.
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 122 (citing
United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188 (1939)).
127 Footnote 5 stresses that the statutes are not identi-
cal, suggesting that identical and overlapping statutes
are to be treated differently. 442 U.S. at 119 n.5.
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DIAGRAM 1
identical statute situation described above, the two
circles completely overlap: all conduct that "A"
proscribes, "B" also proscribes, and vice versa.
Only the punishments are different. An identical
statute situation also exists where a single statute
defines the act prohibited, and then gives two
alternative sentences either of which the prosecutor
can choose at his discretion, with no underlying
guidelines. The situation is most dramatic where
one alternative is a misdeameanor and the other is
a felony.1
8s
The Supreme Court has never dealt with statutes
identical except for punishment. In Batchelder, the
United States argued that even these statutes do
not violate the equal protection clause,'2 but only
the overlapping statutes previously discussed
130
were before the Court. However, all the cases the
government cited' for the proposition that iden-
tical statutes are constitutional held only that over-
lapping statutes with different punishments were
not constitutionally infirm, and did not even dis-
cuss identical, as opposed to overlapping, statutes.
The government's claim that even identical stat-
utes with differing punishments (see diagram 1)
do not violate the equal protection clause is the
most extreme of the three duplicative statute situ-
ations because it gives the most unfettered discre-
'2" See Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C.
1972), affld, 411 U.S. 389 (1974); State v. Pirkey, 203 Or.
697, 281 P.2d 698 (1955); Olsen v. Delmore, 48 Wash. 2d
545, 295 P.2d 324 (1956); and Section II infra.
'2 Brief for Petitioner at 34, United States v. Batch-
elder, 442 U.S. 114.
'30 The statutes are set out in notes 18 and 20 supra. See
generally Section I supra.
'31 Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1959); United
States v. Jones, 527 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United
States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 817 (1976); United States v. Librach, 520 F.2d
550 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976);
People v. McCulloch, 57 Ill. 2d 440, 313 N.E.2d 462;





tion to the prosecutor. Several state supreme courts
have already decided the issue. In State v. Pirky,"3
2
the most widely cited of such cases, the challenged
law forbade the writing of a check on an account
which is known not to have sufficient funds to
cover the check. The law specifically made the
crime prosecutable as either a misdemeanor or a
felony. The Supreme Court of Oregon held this to
be a violation of both the state and federal equal
protection clauses, which guarantee like treatment
to persons similarly situated. The court would not
permit different degrees of punishment to be as-
sessed for the same acts committed under the same
circumstances by persons in like situations. 3 The
Oregon court cited four other state courts that
followed this rule.'1 It further explained that there
was no semblance of classification to enable one to
ascertain under what circumstances one was guilty
of a misdemeanor or of a felony, noting, "This is
not legal classification. It is legal chaos. ' ' Is The
court found absolutely no criteria to guide the
grand jury or the prosecutor in the exercise of
discretion, so the law could not stand.
A large number of state supreme court cases
follow Pirkey.'3 a Many of them go even further and
hold that overlapping statutes are also unconsti-
tutional under the Pirkey rationale.13 7 These cases
affirm the reasoning in Pirkey that where statutes
proscribe identical conduct, they cannot prescribe
different punishment.
32 203 Or. 697, 281 P.2d 698.
i" Id. at 703-704, 281 P.2d at 701.
'3 Id. at 704, 281 P.2d at 702. See Exparte Sohnck, 148
Cal. 262, 82 P. 956 (1905); State ex rel. White v. Bd. of
County Commissioners, 140 Kan.744, 39 P.2d 286 (1934);
Ex parte Sizemore, 110 Tex. Crim. 232, 8 S.W.2d 134
(1928); State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414 (1939).
'w 203 Or. at 705, 281 P.2d at 702.
13 The following cases all cite and follow the holding
in Pirkey. Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C.
1972); State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456; Rose
v. Gladden, 241 Or. 202, 405 P.2d 543 (1965); Black v.
Gladden, 237 Or. 631, 393 P.2d 190 (1964); State v.
Powell, 212 Or. 684, 321 P.2d 333 (1958); State v. Cory,
204 Or. 235, 282 P.2d 1054 (1955); Olsen v. Delmore, 48
Wash. 2d 545, 295 P.2d 324. The cases cited in note 137
infra go even further than Pirkey, and wholeheartedly
endorse the same reasons cited in Pirkey.
'3 If the conduct penalized under one statute can be
identical to the conduct penalized under another statute,
equal protection is violated even where the statutes them-
selves are not identical. Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436
P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d
456; State v. Corey, 204 Or. 235, 282 P.2d 1054; State v.
Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146; State v. Twitch-
ell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075; State v. Collins, 55
Wash. 2d 469, 348 P.2d 214; Olsen v. Delmore, 48 Wash.
2d 545, 295 P.2d 324.
Pirky also hints at the notice problem, developed
more fully in State v. Shondel.138 Where two identical
statutes offered widely different penalties, the court
followed Lanzetta v. New Jersey'3 9 in finding that
penal statutes and their corresponding penalties
must be clear and specific enough that a "person
of ordinary intelligence" can understand them. 40
The Shondel court found that with no criteria in the
identical statute situation, nobody can know what
the penalty is, making for a deprivation of due
process.
141
Pirkey alludes to still another constitutional flaw:
unauthorized delegation of discretionary power.
42
Though the court rested its decision on equal pro-
tection, it suggested that the decision could also
rest on the delegation of the legislature's power to
the executive branch (prosecution). 43 While dele-
gation has seldom succeeded as an argument since
the days of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,'"
Cardozo's cryptic description of the regulatory
scheme there as "delegation running riot' 145 seems
to apply just as much to statutes identical except
for punishment. As in Schechter, the legislature has
not done its job in drafting the statute, and must
be more specific. Schechter serves as the outer limit,
where delegation becomes impermissible,146 and
identical statutes may reach that limit. In Schechter,
the President was given the unbridled power to
draft his own codes of fair competition, in any
manner he wanted. Similarly, the prosecutor has
'38 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146.
9 Id. at 346, 453 P.2d at 148 (citing Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451).
140 306 U.S. at 453.
'' 22 Utah 2d at 346,453 P.2d at 148.
142 203 Or. at 706-07, 281 P.2d at 703.
143 Id.
'" 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See also Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down as an
unconstitutional delegation § 9(c) of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936) (holding that Congress' method of letting the
industries regulate themselves was an unconstitutional
delegation of power). See note 146 infra.
14 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
146 Even though congressional delegations of power
have not been struck down for over forty years, "[i]n no
instance has the [Supreme] Court itself declared the
abandoment of the Panama-Schechter principle. It has
treated these two cases whenever it has had the occasion
to cite them as respected authorities." Merril, Standards-
A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NEB. L.
REv. 469, 472 (1968). Similarly, Judge Skelly Wright
indicated that the reported demise of the delegation
doctrine was "a bit premature," and heartily endorsed
Schechter as an outer limit. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE
L.J. 575, 582 (1972). Contra, Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal
Administration, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1183, 1190 n.37 (1973).
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the power under identical statutes to charge one
person with a misdemeanor and another with a
felony when the acts are identical, again with no
legislative guidance. Thus, the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers is violated.
Before Batchelder, these state supreme court cases
made it clear that statutes identical except for
punishment were unconstitutional. However,
Batchelder casts at least some doubt on this conclu-
sion, even though it involved overlapping rather
than identical statutes. These state cases used the
broad equal protection argument found in the
Berra dissent, but Batchelder limited equal protection
to the defense of discriminatory prosecution. Batch-
elder also held that overlapping statutes gave ade-
quate notice of the penalty because a person could
look at both statutes to determine the range of
possible penalties.
Though Batchelder undercuts some of the reason-
ing found in the state cases on identical statutes,
they still should be found unconstitutional. The
basic difference is one of degree. In overlapping
statutes, the focus frequently is on different types
of conduct, thus giving the prosecutor at least some
idea of which statute he should proceed under.
Where statutes are identical except for punishment,
the prosecutor finds not the slightest shred of guid-
ance. In this most extreme of duplicative statute
situations, the prosecutor's discretion is totally un-
fettered. The significant danger of harrassment"4 '
cannot be overlooked.
Operating under the "rational relationship"
lower tier of the equal protection clause, statutes
identical except for punishment might well be
struck down as unconstitutional on their face. The
many state supreme court cases striking down such
schemes used the sweeping equal protection argu-
ment of Berra, while Batchelder, by citing Yick Wo
and Oyler, limited equal protection to the defense
of discriminatory prosecution. Still, Batchelder in-
volved overlapping rather than duplicative stat-
utes. In the extreme situation embodied in identical
statutes, where there is absolutely no difference in
the statutes except for penalty, the Supreme Court
might use the more lenient test of Pirkey and Berra.
Under this view, it is arbitrary and capricious14 8 to
147 Harrassment dangers are feared in the articles cited
in note 8 supra. For examples of actual harrassment
practices involving the Illinois Armed Violence Statute,
see text accompanying notes 201-04 infra.
1'8 Numerous cases find that statutes which are arbi-
trary and capricious violate even the rational relation
test. For a listing of cases, see 16A AM. JUR. 2D at §§752-
53 (1979).
have widely varying punishments depend on which
statutes the prosecutor chooses when he is given
absolutely no guidance in distinguishing them. An
advantage to this test is that it would not be
necessary to go into the difficulties of proving
membership in a discriminated-against group, as
may be required'49 under a defense of discrimina-
tory prosecution.
The delegation argument also carries great
weight in the identical statute situation. The com-
plete absence of legislative standards places the
situation within the prohibited outer limits defined
by Schechter.
Policy as well as questionable constitutionality
weigh against the use of statutes identical except
for punishment. Harrassment is one factor. In other
traditional areas of prosecutorial discretion, such
as the decision to charge, the amount of evidence
required serves as a guide, and is used in reviewing
the case. Similarly, when choosing from different
charges, where different types of conduct are more
highly penalized, the legislature has decided which
is more dangerous, and wishes both to punish and
to deter future conduct."* Thus the legislature has
given at least some guidance. Even in overlapping
statutes, the types of conduct which differ between
the two statutes can provide clues to the prosecutor.
With identical statutes, there is no guidance and
little review, so harrassment is easier.
In spite of Batchelder, identical statutes are un-
constitutional. No case has ever upheld statutes
which are totally identical except for
punishment.15' With equal protection, delegation,
and policy factors all supporting the existing line
of state cases beginning with Pirkey, the Supreme
Court would probably follow this established set of
cases and hold the statutory scheme unconstitu-
tional if it were to consider an identical statute
case.
B. OVERLAPPING STATUTES
Diagram 2 represents the overlapping statute
situation, where each of the two statutes forbids a
variety of acts, but where some of the acts are
'49 But see United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, and
note 105 supra.
150 Certainty of the punishment to be inflicted is prob-
ably one of the most important elements to deterrence.
The confusion inherent in the identical statute situation
might lessen the deterrent effect. For more details on the
relationships between sentencing and deterrence, see A.
VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976).
151 This was not true in Batchelder, where there were
cases both upholding and striking down overlapping





identical. Again, the duplication problem occurs in
the diagram where "A" and "B" overlap, but the
difference from diagram 1 (identical statutes) is
that both "A" and "B" have elements that are
separate from each other. United States v. Batchelder
involved such a situation. In typical overlapping
statute situations, the prosecutor chooses to proceed
under only one of the two statutes, but has the
option only at the points of intersection. For ex-
ample, in Batchelder the points of intersection in-
cluded any time a felon is in possession of a gun
that has passed through interstate commerce,' 52
and the prosecutor exercised his discretion in se-
lecting the statute with the greater penalty.
Overlapping statute situations are far more com-
mon than identical statutes. Examples besides
Batchelder include the overlap between certain pro-
visions in the Atomic Energy Act and the Espio-
nage Act,sss between different parts of the Federal
Tax Code,"" between federal drug offenses and
those enumerated in the District of Columbia
Code,15 5 between the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,156 between
different provisions within the Omnibus Crime
152 Punishable under both 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), and 18
U.S.C. § 1202(a). For the full text of these statutes, see
notes 18 and 20 supra.
153 See Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (dis-
cussing the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. §§
1810(b), 1816, and the Espionage Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 32(a), 34).
154 See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965);
Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131; United States v.
Coppola, 425 F.2d 660. The discussion of the two over-
lapping statutes in Berra can be found in text and notes
accompanying notes 27-40 supra.
isS See Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 965 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965); Lloyd v. United
States, 343 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
952 (1965) (discussing D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-402 (1961),
26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174, the latter two
repealed in 1970).
56 See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979);
SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453.
Control and Safe Streets Act concerning receipt by
a felon of a firearm which has traveled in interstate
commerce, 57 and between the Mail Fraud Statute
and the Sherman Act.' 5 Overlapping statutes have
also been frequent at the state level.15 9 In fact, it is
probable that the very frequency of overlapping
statutes was a factor in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion to uphold the constitutionality of such stat-
utes.
16 °
The constitutionality of overlapping statutes was
in considerable doubt before Batchelder.16' However,
after Batchelder it is clear that overlapping statutes
are constitutional, even if the acts not covered by
both statutes (the non-intersecting portion of dia-
gram 2) are miniscule in comparison to the conduct
prohibited by both statutes. In Batchelder, there was
only a small difference in how the two statutes
defined a penalty for a previously committed fe-
lony,162 but that difference was crucial for Justice
Marshall. In both a footnote and the text, he
explained that the holding was meant to apply
157 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114;
United States v. Pruner, 606 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Gardner, 605 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Stapleton, 600 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Hairston, 437 F. Supp. 33. The two
statutes are set out in notes 18 and 20 supra.
153The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 11 1978),
provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." The Mail Fraud
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 11 1978), provides in
pertinent part: "Whoever, having devised or intending
to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud... places in
any post office... or knowingly causes to be delivered by
mail ... any such matter or thing...."
Overlap between these acts occurs in the area of
rigging or price fixing, each of which is a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210 (1939). The Mail Fraud
Statute is violated when a scheme to defraud "is carried
out by use of the mail," so charges could be brought
under either statute whenever bid rigging or price fixing
includes mailings. Since 1972 the United States Attorney
for the Northern District of Illinois has made it a practice
in Sherman Act cases to charge mail fraud violation. The
Seventh Circuit has upheld the practice in United States
v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101
(7th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979), and United
States v. Azzarelli Construction Co., 612 F.2d 292 (7th
Cir. 1979).
159 See cases cited in note 136 supra.
160 See text accompanying notes 113-18 supra.
161 One line of cases held them constitutional, see cases
cited in notes 53 and 131 supra, while another line held
them unconstitutional, see notes 51, 136 & 137 supra. See
generally Section I supra.
'62 434 U.S. at 119 n.5.
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only to duplicative statutes that have at least some
difference in the conduct described.es
Marshall's opinion does leave open the possibil-
ity that a legislature wishing to pass identical
statutes might vary the conduct proscribed by a
tiny amount in order to bring the statutes within
the Batchelder opinion. This would escape the likely
fate of identical statutes: to be overturned as un-
constitutional.'r' Given the presumption that leg-
islative motives will not be too closely examined by
a reviewing court unless a suspect classification or
fundamental right is involved,Ies such a legislative
strategy might well succeed.
C. OPTIONAL INCLUDED DUPLICATIVE STATUTES
Optional included duplicative statutes are those
in which the prosecutor has the option to charge
along with a single crime an extra offense aug-
menting the penalty if the crime is committed in a
certain way. If the prosecutor can prove the simple
crime, the extra penalty attaches automatically,
without any additional proof. He retains the option
not to invoke the extra penalty.
The fact that little or no extra proof is required
to trigger the optional included statute distin-
guishes the situation from greater and lesser in-
cluded statutes in their traditional sense.'6s In the
latter situation a certain amount of proof is re-
quired to convict under the lesser statute, while
that amount and an incremental amount of proof
is needed to convict under the greater statute. The
lesser included offense invariably carries a lesser
penalty than the greater offense, but the difference
in proof required places a check on the prosecutor.
For example, simple assault, or placing another in
fear of receiving a battery, is a lesser included
offense of aggravated assault, which is typically
defined as simple assault using a deadly weapon.
67
A potential duplication problem is raised where
the prosecutor has enough evidence to convict
under the greater statute because he still has the
option to proceed under either. The amount of
163/d.
164 See Section IIA supra.
'65 J. NOWAx, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 86, at
524.
'6 For a typical statutory definition of "included of-
fense," see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-9 (1977 & Supp.
1979).
167 For a typical assault and aggravated assault pairing,
see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-1, 12-2 (1977 & Supp.
1979). Section 12-2 includes other aggravating circum-
stances as well as the use of a deadly weapon, including
assaulting a person known to be a policeman, fireman or
teacher.
proof, however, gives the prosecutor an indication
of how to use his discretion. If he can prove up the
more severe statute, he is justified in proceeding
under it because the state has declared the conduct
to be more dangerous to society by penalizing it
more heavily.
Undoubtedly, the above statutory scheme is con-
stitutional, as Batchelder pointed out. 16 However,
the question of optional included duplicative stat-
utes is far less certain. The concept itself is so
elusive that the best way to discuss it is with a
concrete example.
The Illinois Armed Violence Statute defines
armed violence as any felony committed with a
dangerous weapon. 16 Depending on the felony
involved, the armed violence charge can take sev-
eral forms. With respect to crimes such as homicide
or kidnapping, armed violence is not always an
option for the prosecutor because these crimes can
be committed with or without a dangerous
weapon. Where using a dangerous weapon is ac-
tually included in the definition of the crime, such
as in the case of armed robbery, the armed violence
statute would always be available to the prosecutor.
Unlike a lesser included offense, proof elements
provide no guide to the prosecutor. Moreover,
whenever the prosecutor decides to bring charges
both for armed violence and for the felony on
which armed violence rests, the danger is that the
multiple charges, which simply define the same
conduct, can be unduly prejudicial to the defend-
ant.
The Illinois Armed Violence Statute, until re-
cently, existed in a different form. Under the pre-
vious version, the dangerous weapon requirement
was similar, but armed violence could be used only
where an enumerated group of crimes was in-
volved, rather than all felonies.1 70 Most of the
litigation under this version involved aggravated
assault, because even though the conduct required
for conviction necessarily included armed violence,
the former was a misdemeanor while the latter was
'68 434 U.S. at 121.
'69 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33A-2 (1977 & Supp.
1979).
175 ILL. REy. STAT. ch. 38, § 33A-2 (1967) (repealed in
1978), could be applied whenever the following crimes
from ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1977) were charged: kidnap-
ping, § 10-1; aggravated kidnapping, § 10-2; rape, § 11-
1; deviate sexual assault, § 11-3; aggravated assault, §
12-2; aggravated battery, § 12-4; intimidation, § 12-6;
compelling confessions by force, § 12-7; theft of over S150
in value, § 16-1; burglary, § 19-1; resisting a peace officer,




a felony. Armed violence in both forms is a useful
springboard for discussion of optional included
duplicative statutes. In either form it differs from
the statutes previously discussed because it is
charged in addition to, rather than instead of, the
other statutes upon which it rests.
As courts have interpreted it, the legislative in-
tent with respect to the armed violence statute was
simply to "counteract the much publicized increase
in crime rate," and describe certain offenses as
more serious if committed by persons who are
armed.' The Illinois Supreme Court has never
reached the question of whether the duplicative
aspects of the statute are constitutional. The clos-
est it came was in People v. McCollough,17 where the
court held that a prosecutor had the option of
charging an automobile driver who ran over a
pedestrian with either reckless homicide or invol-
untary manslaughter, the latter having the harsher
penalty. It reversed the appellate court, which had
found a deprivation of both due process and equal
protection because of the unguided discretion to
impose different charges of punishment for identi-
cal acts under identical circumstances. 173 The su-
preme court ignored the lower court's reliance on
the Berra dissent,7 holding that the discretion
exercised was like the kind of discretion exercised
every day by the prosecutor in his charging deci-
sions.' 75
Following this opinion, every Illinois appellate
court considering the constitutionality of the armed
violence statute relied on McCollough's discussion of
reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter to
uphold it. 76 Although state courts usually follow
their own supreme court, this reliance is trouble-
some in view of the fact that McCollough was de-
cided 4-3, with the dissent 177 vigorously citing to
Berra, and to four different state supreme court
17 People v. Hardaway, 108 Ill. App. 2d 325, 332, 247
N.E.2d 626, 630 (1969). See also People v. Graham, 25 I1.
App. 3d 853, 859, 323 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1975).
'72 People v. McCollough, 57 Ill. 2d 440, 313 N.E.2d
462 (1974).
173 People v. McCollough, 8 Ill. App. 3d 963, 971, 291
N.E.2d 505, 511 (1972).
'
74 Id. at 970, 291 N.E.2d at 510.
'75 57 I1. 2d at 444, 313 N.E.2d at 464.
176 See People v. Cannes, 61 Ill. App. 3d 865, 378
N.E.2d 552 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979);
People v. Gross, 52 I1. App. 3d 765, 367 N.E.2d 1028
(1977); People v. Hollister, 39 Il1. App. 3d 514, 350
N.E.2d 373 (1976); People v. Anthony, 38 Ill. App. 3d
190, 347 N.E.2d 179 (1976); People v. Graham, 25 Il1.
App. 3d 853, 323 N.E.2d 441.
1757 I1. 2d at 446, 313 N.E.2d at 465 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
cases, 178 all of which refused to allow an equivalent
broad breadth of discretion where exactly the same
conduct is forbidden.
179
The state legislature's response cast additional
doubt on the appellate court's reliance on Mc-
Collough. The legislature effectively overruled the
Illinois Supreme Court by redefining reckless hom-
icide and involuntary manslaughter so that they
no longer required the same elements.18 Even after
this change, however, the appellate courts contin-
ued to uphold the armed violence statute, relying
instead on earlier appellate cases, which in turn
had relied on McCollough."'
Again, the legislature took action, this time
changing the armed violence statute to its present
form. This did not solve all the possible problems
with the statute, 182 but did eliminate the largest
grant of discretion by removing the misdemeanor
of aggravated assault as a base upon which armed
violence could rest. This was sound action on the
legislature's part. Although the situation might be
seen as a constitutionally permissible overlap under
Batchelder because armed violence applies to crimes
other than aggravated assault, aggravated assault
covers no ground that armed violence does not also
cover. Therefore, the situation looks more like iden-
tical statutes (diagram 1), the most extreme situa-
tion, in which case the widely varying penalty
provisions would violate the constitutional rights
of the defendant. The Illinois legislature, whether
intentionally or not, followed the tenets outlined in
Pirkey.s83 Even if a Batchelder overlap situation does
exist, the legislature is still entitled to limit the
prosecutor's discretion. After all, the Supreme
178 Id. at 447-50, 313 N.E.2d at 466-67.
179 Id.
1ss For an examination of these events, see People v.
Hollister, 39 Ill. App. 3d 514, 350 N.E.2d 373. Unfortu-
nately, Illinois does not have legislative history on record,
so often the best that can be done is to trust a court's
interpretation of the legislature's intent.
181 People v. Hollister, 39 Ill: App. 3d 514, 350 N.E.2d
373, recognizing that McCollough was a doubtful author-
ity, instead relied on People v. Graham, 25 Il. App. 3d
853, 323 N.E.2d 441, to uphold the statute. Graham itself
had relied on McCollough. For other cases stressing Graham
in reaching the same result, see People v. Gross, 52 Ill.
App. 3d 765, 367 N.E.2d 1028; People v. Anthony, 38 111.
Ap 3d 190, 347 N.E.2d 179.
The problem of duplication and the option to file
armed violence charges where a felony had been com-
mitted with a dangerous weapon remained. Moreover, a
new problem was added by increasing the penalty for
armed violence so much that it is now far greater than
the penalty for the underlying felony on which it rests.
See text accompanying note 199 infra.
'83 203 Or. 697, 281 P.2d 698.
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Court has said only that the overlapping situation
is not constitutionally infirm. It has not given the
concept a blanket affirmation. Thus the Illinois
legislature's actions show one way to avoid (or
circumvent) the Batchelder holding: rewrite the stat-
utes so the overlap no longer exists.
One problem the state legislature did not cure
in its revision of the armed violence statute is the
undue weight a jury might attach to the presence
of multiple counts, even though they are based on
identical conduct. Neither Batchelder nor the cases
involving identical statutes with varying penalties
addressed this problem because in both situations
the main question was whether the prosecutor had
the option to charge under either statute. He was
not trying to charge both statutes at once. There-
fore, Batchelder is not controlling.
Both the United States Congress and Illinois
courts have recognized that juries have a strong
tendency to compromise on verdicts. Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, quotient verdicts
in cases involving damages are expressly forbid-
den.M Furthermore, in federal and most state
courts, compromising on the lesser crime is not
expressly allowed in criminal cases.ss5 An Illinois
jury looking at charges of armed violence and some
other crime on which it rests, if unsure about the
guilt or innocence of the defendant, might want to
compromise similarly by convicting on one count
while acquitting on the other. However, the Illinois
courts have prevented this from being a problem.
Where a defendant is found guilty of either armed
violence or the statutory crime on which it rests,
but innocent of the other charge, the verdicts are
held to be legally inconsistent because the elements
of the crimes are the same.186 The defendant is
found innocent because the reviewing court as-
sumes that the jury had reasonable doubt based on
its finding of innocence on one of the two
charges.'s
7
1" F.R.C.P. 49(b) provides that when a jury gives
inconsistent answers in a special verdict, the judge must
either send them back for more deliberation or order a
new trial.
18 Comment, Compromise Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 37
NEB. L. REv. 802 (1958).
16 See People v. Pearson, 16 Ill. App. 3d 543, 306
N.E.2d 539 (1973), in which thejury found the defendant
guilty of aggravated assault and not guilty of armed
violence. Since the two charges required exactly the same
acts to convict, the not guilty verdict was held to embody
enough reasonable doubt to warrant dismissing all
charges. Id. at 548, 306 N.E.2d at 543. The court added
that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the case
could not be tried again. Id. at 549, 306 N.E.2d at 543
(citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1969)).
187 Id.
Unfortunately this solves only one of the prob-
lems occurring when juries face multiple charges.
Even if they are not allowed to compromise by
convicting on only one of the two charged crimes,
they still may give undue weight to the fact that
there are so many charges in the first place. A jury
might not realize that even though it looks as if the
defendant has been involved in several possibly
criminal actions, in truth he has only been involved
in one.
The ideal way to test this hypothesis would be
to divide defendants into two groups and compare
their conviction rates. One group would consist of
those charged only with the crime on which the
armed violence charge is based, but who used a
dangerous weapon. The other group would consist
of defendants charged with both the other crime
and armed violence. If the conviction rate for the
latter group were higher, it would mean that the
multiple counts were unduly prejudicing the de-
fendants. Unfortunately, no such research has been
done on this topic.
Other studies, comparing conviction rates for
multiple charges and single charges of the same
magnitude, would be nearly as useful. Surprisingly,
no such study of this type has been made either.ss
However, an analysis of the studies on jury behav-
ior which do exist indicates that the multiple
charges probably are given too much weight. Ac-
cording to Kalven and Zeisel, fully 43% of the jury
cases are rated by thejudge as "close."' 89 Therefore,
any untoward circumstances could tip the balance
against the defendant in a large number of cases.
The credibility of the defendant could be that
ultimate determinant tipping the balance because
it is a crucial factor in how the defendant fares at
the hands of the jury.'9° Since the first thing the
jury learns about the defendant is what he is
charged with,"5 the multiple counts could have
immediate effect, damaging credibility and caus-
'88 Part of the problem may be that recent Supreme
Court decisions permitting the use of six member juries,
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and less than
unanimous verdicts, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972), have caused researchers to turn much of their
efforts in these directions, causing other areas to be
neglected. A survey ofjury research indicates that nearly
every article is on one of these two topics.
I H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 135
(1966).
190 Id. at 168-69.
iSi See M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
IN COURT 87-90 (1978), for the importance of the




ing him to lose a case he might otherwise have
won.
At least one study strongly indicates that there
is a sound basis for fearing multiple counts and
confused juries. After hearing a Florida jury in-
struction that when the defendant pleads not
guilty, the state must prove each material allega-
tion of the information or indictment beyond a
reasonable doubt, 6% of the jurors thought the
state need prove only a "majority" of the charges.1
9 2
Five percent of the jurors were so confused that
they thought the defendant was required to carry
the burden of proving his own innocence, 3%
thought the judge was to decide innocence, and 9%
were simply uncertain. 93 Ifjuries became this con-
fused over the burden of proof to prove a single
charge, then filing multiple charges can only com-
pound the confusion.
The armed violence statute can inflame the jury
as well as confuse it. If the jury is presented with
two charges rather than one, it may believe that
more than one type of criminal conduct is involved,
even though both statutes actually define the same
conduct. The confusion may be great enough to
cause the jury to believe that the defendant has
been involved in several criminal acts, and that he
therefore has a criminal character. From this, it is
an easy step to assume that somebody with a
criminal character has committed the act he is
accused of.
This danger has been recognized in other situa-
tions. Congress prevents the prosecution from pre-
senting evidence of the defendant's past crimes or
wrongs to show that he acted in conformity with
them by committing the crime charged. 98 The
danger is that the past crimes will cause the jury to
believe the defendant is a criminal and therefore
convict him. Multiple charges based on the same
conduct have a similar effect. The extra charges
magnify the act out of all proportion, making the
defendant look worse than he really is.
The comparison to evidence of past criminal acts
is particularly apt because jury research has shown
that such evidence has the very effect that legisla-
192 Strawn & Buchanan, Juwy Confusion: A Threat to




1m FED. R. Evm. 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of mo-
tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, know-
ledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
tors and judges195 alike have feared. Broeder's study
of the impact of past crimes on the jury shows that
the jury badly wants to know about them, and will
discuss and use such evidence to infer guilt even if
it is not admitted into evidence.196 Other studies
have obtained similar findings.
1 97
Congress's fear of the use of the criminal repu-
tation to infer guilt' 98 is justified in light of the
findings of the various jury research studies. The
same jury behavior almost certainly takes place
when the armed violence statute is charged. De-
fendants charged with armed violence are at a
great disadvantage because of the undue prejudice
that charge will cause.
Thus the problem which was not ruled on in
Batchelder becomes clear. The prosecutor's discre-
tion to bring multiple charges or a single charge
for the same act permits him to choose which
defendants will get a confused and inflamed jury.
Note that though the prosecutor has similar discre-
tion to bring greater and lesser included charges,
that situation is different because the two involve
different conduct, and the jury knows it must
choose between the two on the basis of proof
adduced at trial. When, however, the multiple
charges are armed violence and the offense on
which it rests, the jury must take both statutes or
none; variations of proof do not let it choose the
statute under which to convict.
In the armed violence setting, erratic jury behav-
ior suggests that the defendant charged under both
statutes is more likely to be convicted than one
charged only with the single underlying non-armed
violence statute. Thus the situation provides a twist
from Batchelder. There, the penalties were different,
but the jury was no more likely to convict under
one than under the other. Under the Illinois Armed
Violence Statute, not only are the penalties more
disparate than those in Batchelder,'" but also the
"9
5 See United States v. Ostrowsky, 501 F.2d 318 (7th
Cir. 1974); People v. Stadtman, 59111. 2d 229, 319 N.E.2d
813 (1974); FED. R. EVID. 404(b), Advisory Committee's
Note.
196 D. Broeder, A Series of Cross-Case Essays on Jury
Behavior, § 10 (November, 1957) (unpublished work
from University of Chicago Jury Project, available at
Northwestern University Law Library).
'
97 See generally Comment, Developments in Evidence of
Other Crimes, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 535 (1974). To the
extent that past crimes affect the defendant's credibility,
which is of crucial importance at trial, see H. KALVEN &
H. ZEISEL, supra note 189, at 168-69; Sonaike, The Influence
ofJury Deliberation on Juror Perception of Trial, Credibility, and
Damage Awards, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REv. 889.
1
9 8 See note 195 supra.
199 In Batchelder the difference in penalties was three
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actual probability of conviction appears to increase
when armed violence is charged.
The equal protection argument against the Illi-
nois Armed Violence Statute is therefore stronger
than the equal protection argument in Batchelder.
This is especially interesting in light of the Mc-
Collough dissent, which stressed equal protection
rather than due process or delegation:
[Tihe decision to prosecute for one offense rather
than the other is in no way dictated by the available
evidence or the elements of the crime. I believe that
this type of scheme, which allows such a great disparity
in the punishment of precisely the same conduct according to
the caprice of the prosecutor .. .violates the equal protection
of the laws. (emphasis added)' °
The actual day-to-day use of the armed violence
statute suggests that such caprice indeed exists, and
that it is dangerous to give prosecutors the discre-
years because the less harsh penalty was set at two years
and the harsher at five years. However, armed violence
is a Class X felony, therefore punishable by 6 to 30 years,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33A-2, while the most minor
felony (Class 4) with which armed violence can be
charged is punishable by one to three years, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1977 & Supp. 1979). Therefore,
the difference in possible maximum penalties is a stag-
gering 27 years.
An example of a current attack on the Class X provi-
sion for armed violence involves its pairing with voluntary
or involuntary manslaughter. Since the legislature ad-
dressed itself specifically to homicides in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 9 (1977 & Supp. 1979), it fixed the penalties for
murder, voluntary, and involuntary manslaughter by the
seriousness of the crimes. To let the prosecutor add armed
violence would undermine this careful scheme and re-
place the legislature's judgment with the prosecutor's.
Since the legislature must have known that most homi-
cides occur with a dangerous weapon, it has presumably
already taken the probability of being armed into ac-
count. In addition, the use of a gun, as opposed to
pushing somebody out a window, cannot be seen as the
greater harm to society. The legislature did not intend to
make this distinction or to give the prosecutor such an
option. See Motion of Defendant at 2, 6, State v. Rollins,
Circuit Court of Cook County, Information No. 79-I-
2620 (January 3, 1980).
200 People v. McCollough, 57 Ill. 2d at 448, 313 N.E.2d
at 466. A suggestion that the Illinois Supreme Court may
soon strike down the statute came in People v. Vriner, 74
Ill. 2d 329, 385 N.E.2d 671 (1978), where the defendant
was charged under the old aggravated assault armed
violence provision. Although the court had been asked to
overrule McCollough, the court explained that it would
not reach consideration of it because it could find for the
defendant on other grounds. Id. at 344-45, 385 N.E.2d at
678. The court easily could have said in dicta that
McCollough remains good law; its failure to do so indicates
it might be waiting for the proper case in which to strike
down both McCollough and the armed violence statute.
tion to charge the duplicative statute in addition
to the statute upon which it rests. Illinois prosecu-
tors are using the statute in plea bargaining to
coerce the defendant into pleading guilty,2"' espe-
cially under the new version of armed violence,
which makes it a Class X felony punishable by six
to thirty years.20 2 According to many public de-
fenders, instead of using the statute where the
crime has been particularly heinous, the prosecu-
tors have been using it when their case is border-
line, to bolster its strength.20 Even several state's
attorneys have conceded that at least some of this
goes on, although they think the occurrences are
very rare.2
4
Written guidelines would alleviate some of these
problems,20 5 although guidelines alone are not
likely to make an unconstitutional statute consti-
tutional. When placed in the perspective of the
Batchelder and the Berra dissent cases, actions in
Illinois appear to justify Justice Black's fears of
caprice and unfair differential treatment. Even if
the armed violence statute avoids Batchelder on its
facts (because the overlap between the statutes
emphasized in Batchelder is not strictly present), it
201 This is the opinion of five Cook County public
defenders, who have asked not to be identified. Prosecu-
tors from Cook, Dupage, and McHenry counties also
admit that such activities take place, but find nothing
unconstitutional about them. They are essentially correct.
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), the
prosecutor threatened the accused with the state habitual
criminal statute if he refused to plead guilty to forgery,
and then used it, as promised, to obtain a life sentence.
The Court found no abuse of discretion. It was not
retaliation because the accused was free to accept or
reject the offer. Id. at 363. Thus, the use of the armed
violence statute in this fashion is constitutional. Most of
the comment on the Bordenkircher decision, however, has
been unfavorable, stressing the unfairness to the defend-
ant in an unequal bargaining position, and the possibility
of prosecutorial vindictiveness. See Note, 6 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 201 (1978); Note, 33 ARK. L. REV. 211 (1979); Note,
27 BUFFALO L. REV. 563 (1978); Note, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
875 (1978); Note, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 269 (1978);
Note, 26 KAN. L. REV. 651 (1978); Note, 19 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 249 (1979); Note, 24 VILL. L. REV. 142 (1978).
The armed violence statute should not be used for the
same reasons.
202 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1977 & Supp.
1979).
m The same five public defenders as in note 201 supra
gave this opinion.
2 This opinion is held by the prosecutors cited in note
201 supra.
20 ChiefJudge Bazelon found that the fact that certain
guidelines were set out in the U.S. Attorney's Manual
indicated that the discretion exercised was not unbridled.
Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d at 975 (Bazelon,
C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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still shows the folly of the Batchelder rationale.
Whether an Illinois court uses equal protection
(possibly under the state rather than federal con-
stitution to get around Batchelder),2° or distin-
guishes it, the armed violence statute illustrates
some of the dangerous and prejudicial results which
can occur in the optional included duplicative
statute setting. It should be struck down as uncon-
stitutional.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Batchelder establishes that where two statutes pro-
hibit some of the same conduct, but where each
also prohibits conduct the other does not, the pros-
ecutor may proceed under either statute if the
206 Indeed, many of the state cases finding duplicative
statutes to be unconstitutional rest on both federal and
state grounds. See Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436 P.2d
18; Rose v. Gladden, 241 Or. 202, 405 P.2d 543; State v.
Cory, 204 Or. 235, 282 P.2d 1054; State v. Pirkey, 203
Or. 697, 281 P.2d 698; State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343,
453 P.2d 146; State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314,333 P.2d




defendant's conduct falls within the common pros-
cription. Batchelder can be attacked on both legal
and policy grounds, but it was a unanimous opin-
ion, and therefore unlikely to be reversed. The
Batchelder opinion, however, covers only one of the
three separate categories in which duplicative stat-
utes may fall. Overlapping statutes are constitu-
tional, but an unbroken line of state cases indicates
that statutes identical except for penalty are un-
constitutional. The case is not as clear for optional
included duplicative statutes, but the dangers of
prejudice indicate that they too should not be used.
Legislatures have the option to prevent all three
situations by careful drafting. The inherent unfair-
ness in treating similarly situated defendants dif-
ferently outweighs the advantages in individualiz-
ing system response to defendants to such an extent
that this area of prosecutorial discretion should be
removed. Legislatures should draft statutes so that
no two statutes (except greater and lesser included
statutes) can be interpreted to prohibit the same
conduct, thus taking the choice out of the prose-
cutor's hands.
MARTIN H. Tisa
